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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES
Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
United States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct. 1185 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION

Last Term the Supreme Court used its authority1

under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
to limit testimonial privileges in federal criminal
trials. In Trammel v. United States2 the Court narrowed the broad privilege that was the legacy of its
decision in Hawkins v. United States by holding that
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony
vests in the witness spouse alone and that such a
witness may neither be compelled to testify nor
foreclosed from testifying.4 In UnitedStates v. Gillock s
the Court held that there is no speech or debate
privilege barring the introduction of evidence of
the legislative acts of a state legislator in a federal
criminal prosecution.' The Court found that the
language and legislative history of Rule 501 revealed that such a privilege is not an established
part of the federal common law and therefore is
not applicable through the Rule. The Court also
concluded that principles of federalism did not
8
compel the privilege.
In Trammel, the Court balanced the "right to
every man's evidence" 9 against a broad spousal
privilege, and in Gillock, it balanced the right to
enforce federal criminal statutes against the legislative privilege. The Court limited or rejected evidentiary privileges in these cases because it viewed
the privileges as unduly hampering legitimate law
enforcement efforts. The Court's promotion of the
federal interest in criminal prosecutions indicates
that it is concerned with facilitating the trial of
persons charged with federal crimes at the expense
of privileges designed to promote socially desirable
conduct. The decision in Trammel achieved a restructuring of the law of marital privilege although
1 "[The privilege of a witness.. .Shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
2 100 S.Ct. 906 (1980).
3 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958).
4 100 S.Ct. at 914.
5 100 S.Ct. 1185 (1980).
6Id. at 1194.
7Id. at 1190.
8
Id. at 1193.
9United States v.Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).

the Court failed to fashion a rule completely consistent with sound policy. The decision in Gillock
sacrificed the important policy of promoting state
legislators' independence to the federal interest in
the conviction of criminals.
II.

TRAMMEL v.

UNITED STATES

By vesting the testimonial privilege solely in the
witness spouse, the Court in Trammel rid itself of a
rule which did not advance the ends it was theoretically designed to promote. It refused, however,
to seize the opportunity to update completely the
law of marital privilege by holding that only a
privilege protecting confidential marital communications would be retained.
A. FACTS AND HOLDING

Prior to a trial on a narcotics indictment, Otis
Trammel moved to sever his case from that of his
two codefendants, asserting his claim to a privilege
to prevent his wife, an unindicted co-conspirator,
from testifying against him.'0 The district court
denied the motion after a hearing at which Trammel's wife was called as a government witness
under a grant of use immunity and at which she
testified that her cooperation with the government
was based on assurances that she would be given
lenient treatment." The district court ruled that
she could testify in support of the government's
case to any act she observed during the marriage
and to any communication
made in the presence
2
of a third person.1
After he was tried and convicted, Trammel appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit on the grounds that the admis'0100 S. Ct. at 908.
"Id. The Supreme Court concluded that even though
Trammel's wife chose to testify after a grant of immunity
and assurances of lenient treatment, her testimony was
voluntary. 100 S. Ct. at 914. See note 19 infra.
12100 S. Ct. at 908. The Court also ruled that confidential communications between Trammel and his wife
were privileged and inadmissible. Id. The rule protecting
confidential marital communications was not at issue in
Trammel. For discussion of that rule, see Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); C. MCCOR MICK, EVIDENCE

§§ 78-86 (2d ed. 1972).
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sion of the adverse testimony of his wife over his
objection was reversible error. 13 Trammel alleged
that the district court's admission of his wife's
adverse testimony contravened the rule set forth by
the Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United States14 that
the testimony of one spouse against the other is
barred unless both consent.' 5 The court of appeals
rejected his contention and concluded that Hawkins
did not prohibit the voluntary testimony of a
spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity 6from the government
in return for her testimony.'
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger.' 7 The Court modified the
Hawkins rule' 8 so that the witness spouse alone has
the privilege to refuse to testify adversely.' 9 The
Chief Justice cited Rule 50120 and Hawkins2 ' as
authority for the Court's re-examination of the
testimonial privilege "in the light of reason and
'3

100 S. Ct. at 909.

14358

U.S. at 78.

15"100 S. Ct. at 909.
16United States v.

Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168

(10th
7 Cir. 1978).
1 Justice Stewart submitted a separate opinion
in
which he concurred in the judgment of the Court.
18 "While the rule forbidding testimony of one
spouse
for the other was supported by reasons which time and
changing legal practices had undermined, we are not
prepared to say the same about the rule barring testimony
of one spouse against the other." Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. at 77 (emphasis in original).
'9100 S. Ct. at 914. It also stated that even though a
spouse chooses to testify after a grant of immunity and
assurances of lenient treatment, her testimony is not
involuntary. Id. Cf Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978) (characterizing the "give and take" of plea bargaining as a voluntary exchange). Justice Stewart, in his
concurring opinion in Hawkins, suggested that the adverse
testimony of the spouse in that case, who was herself
subject to prosecution, could not be voluntary because
the government possessed great influence over the witness
in the form of offers of leniency. Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. at 82-83 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2oSee text accompanying note 38 infra.
21 See text accompanying note 39 infra. The Hawkins
decision modified the Court's holding in Funk v. United
States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). In Funk, the Court abolished
the testimonial disqualification preventing the accused's
spouse from testifying either for or against the accused in
any case, civil or criminal. Id. at 386. See C. MCCORMICK,

supra note 12, § 66. The Funk decision enabled the spouse
of a defendant to testify in the defendant's behalf, 290
U.S. at 386, but retained a privilege against adverse
spousal testimony whereby either spouse could prevent
the other from giving adverse testimony. Id. at 373. The
Court reasoned that the ancient policies for disqualifying
a wife from testifying in behalf of her husband in criminal
cases were no longer acceptable, id. at 381, but did not
discuss her competency to testify against him. Id. at 373.
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22

experience.
As an indication of the erosion of
support for an unwise rule, the Court looked to the
trend in the state law since Hawkins toward divesting the accused of the privilege to bar adverse
spousal testimony.23 The Court also examined the
roots of the rule,2 which were firmly ensconced in
medieval jurisprudential canons that have long
since been abandoned,2s and the modem justification for the rule, which is the fostering of marital
harmony.2 6 It concluded that neither the ancient
nor the modern rationale justified retention of the
Hawkins rule. The Court noted that the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony swept more
broadly than the testimonial privileges for attorney
and client, physician and patient, and priest and
penitent, which are similar to the rule protecting
confidential marital communications. s
B.

ANALYSIS

Rules of privilege are substantive laws designed
to influence the conduct of individualsas Unlike
rules of exclusion which guard against unreliable,
prejudicial, or misleading evidence, they do not aid
in the discovery of truth. Instead, they serve to
r rotect interests and relationships that society
100 S. Ct. at 910-11.
23Id.

at 911-12. See text accompanying notes 49-51

infra.

J. WIoMORE, EVI§ 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore makes
the following observations on the origin of the privilege:
The history of the privilege not to testify against
one's wife or husband is involved.., in a tantalizing
obscurity. That it existed by the time of Lord Coke
is plain enough, but of the precise time of its origin,
as well as the process of thought by which it was
reached, no certain record seems to have survived.
What is a little odd is that it comes into sight about
the same time as the disqualification of husband
and wife to testify on one another's behalf..., for
the two have no necessary connection in principle,
and yet they travel together, associated in judicial
phrasing, from almost the beginning of their recorded journey.
Id. at 211.
2 Long since abandoned are the medieval jurisprudential canons which necessitated a privilege against adverse
spousal testimony: the common law rule of incompetency
that excluded the testimony of interested parties to a
lawsuit, 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2227, and the idea
that the husband and wife were "two souls in one flesh,"
E. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6B (1628),
quoted in 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 24, § 2227.
26 100 S. Ct. at 909.
27
Id. at 913-14.
2
8 Id. at 913.
2

100 S. Ct. at 909. See generally 8

DENCE

2
3

C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 12,
Id.

§
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deems of sufficient importance to justify the suppression of facts necessary to the adjudicatory process. 3 1 Since the protection ensured by the testi-

monial privilege frustrates the working of the fundamental principle the Court has articulated that
''
"the public has a right to every man's evidence, "
privileges must be strictly construed.33 Only in the
rare instance when the privilege serves a transcendent public good will a court thrust aside the allimportant search for evidence.34 Neither the ancient nor the modem social policies justify the
retention of the privilege against adverse testimony
by either spouse, except in the area of confidential
communications.
The confidential marital communications privilege provides that communications in private between husband and wife are assumed to be confidential unless the subject of the discussion or the
circumstances belie that assumption.35 If a third
person, other than a child who is too young to
understand, is present to the knowledge of the
communicating spouse, the communication is not
privileged. 36 In order to encourage free communispouse is the holder of
cation, the communicating
37
this privilege.
Trammel, however, did not deal with a privilege
protecting confidential marital communications. It
dealt only with the privilege to refuse to testify
adversely, which protects communications made in
the presence of third parties. The Court properly
discarded the rule that the testimony of one spouse
against the other is barred unless both consent by
using its authority under Rule 501.
Congress enacted Rule 501 to allow the courts
flexibility in developing the law of privilege' in
cases such as Trammel, which require the re-examination of outmoded social policies. Moreover, the
Court in Hawkins was careful to point out that its
decision was not meant to "foreclose whatever
changes in the rule [against adverse spousal testimony] may eventually be dictated by 'reason and
experience.'

"39

However, the Hawkins Court in

31Id.
32 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331.
33 100 S. Ct. at 912.
34 Id. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Accord, United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).
5See C. McCORMIcK, supra note 12, § 80.

1958 noted that:
there is still a widespread belief, grounded on present
conditions, that the law should not force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and

wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences.
Under these circumstances we are unable to subscribe to the idea that an exclusionary rule based on
the persistent instincts of several centuries should
now be abandoned.4
In 1980 the Trammel Court acknowledged that
the reasons satisfying the Hawkins Court were no
longer viable. 4 ' In doing this, the Court has embraced the view Justice Stewart propounded in his
concurring opinion in Hawkins.4 ' There, Justice
Stewart observed that a rule which stemmed from
long-abandoned concepts, criticized by numerous
scholars, and modified by many states deserved
close scrutiny from the Court, and not merely its
indulgence in naive assumptions. 43 These criticisms
of the privilege Justice Stewart advanced were
valid in 1958 and remain valid in 1980."
In Hawkins, the Court supported its retention of
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony by
emphasizing that most states retained the exclusionary rule in some form.45 But since 1958 many
states have moved
46 toward divesting an accused of
the privilege. At the time of the Hawkins decision,
thirty-one jurisdictions allowed an accused a privilege to prevent adverse spousal testimony, 47 and
in 1980 only twenty-fourjurisdictions followed that
rule. 45 Moreover, seventeen states have abolished
all marital privileges not involving confidential
communications in criminal cases. 49 Since the control of laws governing marriage is the traditional
province of the state,-° the trend in state law away
limited
from the Hawkins rule and toward a more
51
spousal privilege is especially significant.
40Id.

41 100 S. Ct. at 914. Justice Stewart, however, in his
concurring opinion, stated that the foundations of the

privilege had disappeared well before the 1958 Hawkins
decision. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
42 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 81-83 (Stewart, J., concurring). See 100 S. Ct. at 914 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
4 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 81-82.
4

See 100 S. Ct. at 914.

37

States, 358 U.S. at 78-79.
"s
46 Hawkins v. United
See 100 S. Ct. at 911-12 n.9.
47 Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 81 n.3.

-1

49

36id.

Id. at § 83.
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CoNa. REc.
40891 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1973).
9Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 79.

48 100 S. Ct. at 911-12 n.9.
Id.

50Id. at 912. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975).
"5100 S. Ct. at 912.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Furthermore, many authorities have criticized52
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
Wigmore labelled it "the merest anachronism in
legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to
truth in practice,"53 while McCormick denounced
it as "an archaic survival of a mystical religious
dogma. ' ' Both the Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence of the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute's 1942
Model Code of Evidence rejected a rule vesting in
the defendant the right to exclude adverse spousal
testimony, and advocated the privilege only for
confidential marital communications.55 Similarly,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws called the rule of not requiring
one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal
action "a sentimental relic" and advised limiting
the privileges to confidential communications between the spouses.5
The rule vesting the witness spouse with the
privilege to refuse to testify adversely may advance
the stated goal of avoidance of dissension in the
marital relationship.5 7 However, it does not encourage and strengthen a married couple's private
relationship. The privilege protecting confidential
marital communications serves this latter goal because the full disclosure of private thoughts and
feelings between spouses helps to achieve the trust
and confidence necessary to a healthy marriage.
The privileging of statements made in the presence
of others, however, is unlikely to encourage this full
disclosure because the spouses have no expectation
52 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 215, Comment a (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 23(2), Comment (1953); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66; 8 J.
WIOMORE, supra note 24, § 2228; 63 REPORTS OF THE ABA
570, 594-95 (1938).
38 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2228, at 221.
54C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66, at 145.
"MODEL

CODE OF EVIDENCE rule

REPORTS OF THE ABA 594-95.
56 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE

215,

Comment a;

23(2), Comment.

63

See Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives:A Critical Examination of the ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence as
They Affect MaritalPrivilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 137071 (1973). Marital dissension may be avoided if the
witness spouse refuses to testify against his defendant
spouse. However, in those cases in which the witness
spouse chooses to testify, like Trammel, marital dissension
is not avoided. McCormick notes that "family harmony
is nearly always past saving when the spouse is willing to
aid the prosecution." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 66,
at 145. The Court itself admits that "[w]hen one spouse
is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve."
100 S. Ct. at 913.
57
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of privacy when they converse in front of other
people. The need for evidence in federal criminal
trials is too great to allow a sweeping privilege
which shields communications made when third
parties are known to be present.M Those types of
communications are undeserving of a privilege because they do not encourage the repose of complete
trust in a single person, the marriage partner. The
key to the social policy of encouraging the marital
relationship lies not in who holds the privileges to
refuse to testify adversely, but in what type of
communication is affected. The right to privacy in
the marital relationship is fundamental, a necessary safeguarding of the basic social unit.59 Only
this interest, which is protected by the confidential
communications privilege, outweighs the pressing
need for evidence in criminal trials. Therefore,
Trammel should have discarded entirely the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, leaving only
the privilege protecting private marital communications.
III.

UNITED STATES

v.

GILLOCK

The Court again demonstrated its reluctance to
grant privileges that unduly burden law enforcement efforts in United States v. Gillock.60 But in

Gillock, the Court's promotion of law enforcement
efforts sacrificed the delicate constitutional balance
between federal and state government by aggrandizing the federal interest in the enforcement of its
criminal statutes.
A. FACTS AND HOLDING

Edgar Gillock, a Tennessee state senator, was
indicted on federal charges that he accepted money
for the use of his public office to block the extradition of a criminal defendant from the state and
that he had agreed to introduce state legislation to
enable certain individuals to obtain master electricians' licenses which they had failed to obtain
through existing processes. 6 ' Before trial, the dis" Unlike the privileges between attorney and client,
see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §§ 87-97, physician
and patient, id. at §§ 98-105, and priest and penitent, id.
at § 77, the testimonial privilege protects not only private
communications, but permits the exclusion of spousal
testimony about communications made with no expectation of privacy. Id. at § 66.
59Reutlinger, supra note 57, at 1370-71.
60 100 S. Ct. 1185 (1980).
61 100 S. Ct. at 1187. The government's offer of proof
charged him with soliciting money in exchange for using
his influence as a state senator to block the extradition of
a fugitive from Illinois. Id. at 1188. The government
offered to prove that Gillock appeared at the extradition
hearing, reviewed the extradition papers, questioned the
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trict court granted the senator's motion to suppress
all evidence relating to his legislative activities,
holding that Gillock had an evidentiary privilege
cognizable under Rule 501.62 The district court

equated the senator's privilege with that granted
members of both houses of Congress under the
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution and
concluded that it prohibited the introduction of
evidence of the senator's legislative acts and his
underlying motivations. 6a The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a divided vote
affirmed the district court in its protection of the
privilege.6

hearing officer about the propriety of extradition on a
misdemeanor charge, and requested an official opinion
from the Tennessee Attorney General on the subject. Id.
Furthermore, the government stated that it intended to
introduce at trial the transcript of a telephone call during
which Gillock declared that he could have blocked the
extradition proceedings by exerting pressure on the extradition hearing officer who had appeared before Gillock's senate judiciary committee on a budgetary matter.
Id The government also indicated that it would prove
that Gillock attended a meeting of the senate judiciary

committee where the extradition hearing officer presented his department's budget request. Id
Next, the government offered proof that Gillock used
his influence to assist four individuals in obtaining master
electrician's licenses. Id. at 1188-89. The prosecution
indicated that it would offer evidence that Gillock fixed
a contingent fee of $5000 per person, to be refunded if
Gillock were unsuccessful. Id. at 1189. The government
offered to prove that Gillock introduced legislation providing for reciprocity among states in licensing of electricians, and made statements on the floor of the senate in
support of the bill. Id. The government sought to show
that when opposition to the bill was voiced by union
representatives, Gillock replied that he could not withdraw the bill because he had accepted fees for introducing
it. Id. The government also intended to prove that Gillock
moved to override the Governor's veto of the legislation.
Id.
62 Id. at 1188. For the language of Rule 501, see note 1
supra.
r' 100 S. Ct. at 1188.
The Speech or Debate Clause provides that Senators

and Representatives:
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from *Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in

either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
r 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978). Chief Judge Edwards
concluded "that the long history and the felt need for
protection of legislative speech or debate and the repeated
and strong recognition of that history in the cases we
have cited from the Supreme Court, fully justify our
affirming... [the] protection of the privilege in this case."
Id. at 290.

The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by

Chief Justice Burger.65 In holding that a state
legislator possessed no speech or debate type privilege in a federal criminal prosecution, 6 the Court
first determined that such a privilege was not
applicable through Rule 501 as an established part
of the federal common law.Y The Court further
found that the policy of legislative independence
which inspired the Constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause does not compel a similar privilege for state
legislators.ss Principles of comity between the federal government and the states yielded to the important federal interest in enforcement of criminal
statutes. 69 The Court identified only a "speculative
benefit to the state legislative process" as a result
of recognition of a speech or debate privilege for
state legislators, but recognized the
government's
70
interest as urgent and overriding.
65Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell, dissented for the reasons stated by Chief Judge Edwards in
his opinion in this case for the Sixth Circuit. 100 S. Ct. at
1194 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' Id. The Chief Justice did note, however, that were
the Court to recognize an evidentiary privilege similar to
the federal speech or debate privilege, much of the evidence at issue in this case would be inadmissible under
the standard applicable to members of Congress. Id. at
1190.
' Id. The Chief Justice noted that the language and
legislative history of Rule 501 failed to support Gillock's
argument that the privilege was applicable through the
Rule. Id. See note 1 supra; note 38 & accompanying text
supra; PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 501-13, 56 F.R.D. 183,
230-60 (1973).
ChiefJustice Burger cited the House Conference Committee Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974), as
support for the proposition that Rule 501 requires the
application of federal privilege law in federal criminal
cases. 100 S. Ct. at 1190. Cf. Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7, 13; Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. at 379.
Because of this requirement, the evidentiary privilege
guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that "for any speech or debate in either House,
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in
any other place," TENN. CONsT. art. 2, § 13, which may
be asserted in a criminal prosecution in state court, does
not compel the same privilege in a federal prosecution.
10068S. Ct. at 1190.
Id. at 1192-93.
Old at 1193.
70
Id. The Chief Justice added that Congress might
have provided that a state legislator prosecuted under
federal law receive the same privilege as a member of
Congress or might have instructed the federal courts to
apply to a state legislator the same evidentiary privileges
available in a similar prosecution in the courts of the
state, but did not. Id. at 1193-94. The Chief Justice
concluded that, given the absence of a constitutional
limitation on Congress' power to submit state officials to
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B. ANALYSIS

The roots of the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Federal Constitution are in English history.7 1 Conflicts between monarchs and Parliament during
which a series of kings used the judicial process to
suppress and intimidate critical legislators72 ultimately led the Founding Fathers to include a
privilege for legislators in the Constitution.7" In
analyzing the purpose of the clause, the Court in
United States v. Johnson stated:
There is little doubt that the instigation of criminal
charges against critical or disfavored legislators by
the executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear
prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in England and, in the context of the American
system of separation of powers, is the predominate
[sic] thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause.7 4
Furthermore, the Framers did not intend the immunities of the Clause to inure to individual members of Congress in their personal capacities, but to
ensure the integrity of the legislative process
through the protection of individual legislators.72
The policy underlying the adoption of the Speech
or Debate Clause, then, is the Framers' perceived
need for legislative independence. The same policy
considerations which recommended adoption of
the federal Speech or Debate Clause call for recognition of a speech or debate privilege for state
legislators.
Principles of comity inherent in our federal system also require the creation of an evidentiary
privilege for state legislators. While the Court acknowledged that "principles of comity command
careful consideration," 76 it concluded that its "cases
disclose that where important federal interests are
at stake, as in the enforcement
of federal criminal
77
statutes, comity yields.,
The Court's holding in National League of Cities v.
Use'y 78 that a federal statute regulating the wages
of state employees was unconstitutional because it
"operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom
federal criminal sanctions, there was no reason for the
Court to create a privilege hindering the proof of relevant
facts. Id. at 1[194.
71 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
508
(1972).
72
ee United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178
(1966).
73
See 100 S. Ct. at 1191.
74 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 182.
5
See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.
76100 S.Ct. at 1193.
77id.
78426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions ' ' 9 supports the argument that principles of comity require the extension of the privilege to state legislators. The opinion
in Usery evidenced the Court's concern with federal
intervention in traditional state functions, but its
denial of the legislative privilege in Gillock seems to
belie this concern. A powerful federal government
should not be allowed to tamper with a state's
legislature, which is an integral part of the state
governmental structure, if the state is to retain a
measure of independence. Federal prosecutors
should not be permitted to frustrate state selfgovernment, one of the cornerstones of our federal
system.
The Court pointed out that Usey distinguished
between regulation of individuals and legislation
which directly regulates the internal functions of
states, s ° implicitly classifying the instant case as the
former. 8 ' Gillock, however, deals not with individuals, but with the integrity of the legislative process,
a crucial part of any state's government.8
Finally, the Court concluded that the hardship
visited upon Gillock as a result of denial of the
privilege "is not in any sense analogous to the
direct regulation" considered in Usery.s 3 The authors of the Constitution, however, deemed the
potential disruption of the legislative process to be
very great indeed. s 4
The Gillock Court implied that a speech or debate privilege for state legislators was less tenable
than the executive privilege rejected in UnitedStates
v. Nixon (Nixon I).' Nixon I, however, can be distinguished from Gillock. The Court denied the executive privilege in Nixon I because the President
claimed an "absolute, unqualified.., privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances."' 6 The Court balanced the "generalized
assertion" of executive privilege against the "inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration
of criminal justice.""7 It refused to sustain an abuse
of the executive privilege in the form of an absolute
privilege of confidentiality for all of Nixon's communications in light of the great need for evidence.as
79

Id.at 852.

8o100 S.Ct. at 1192. See 426 U.S. at 840-4 1.
s'100 S. Ct. at 1192.
82 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507.

83 100 S.Ct. at 1192.
84See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-79.
"5418 U.S. 683 (1974).
6Id. at 706.
87Id.at 711-13.
8

8Id. at 713.
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Gillock's claim, however, is not of an absolute,
unqualified privilege, but merely of protection
"against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular
course of the legislative process and into the moti'
vation for those acts."8
He also claimed no privilege for any communication made in any capacity
other than his legislative role. Since the legislator's
acts, votes, and decisions alone form the basis for
the privilege,9° its scope is more restricted than that
of the privilege claimed in Nixon I. The Court's
likening of the Gillock and Nixon I situations, therefore, is misleading.
The Court's dismissal of the "speculative benefit
to the state legislative process" 91 and the "minimal
impact on the exercise of the legislative function"92
is unwarranted. The benefit to the state legislative
process cannot be said to be speculative, for the
Framers deemed the legislative independence of
members of Congress to be important enough to
merit constitutional protection. The danger of inhibition of legislative freedom looms just as large
in the case of state legislators as it does in the case
of members of Congress. The Third Circuit in In re
93
GrandJuiyProceedings
noted the possible harm to
important state legislative functions: "[State legislators'] work could be substantially hindered by
exposing members to litigation arising out of the
performance of legislative duties."' ' One panel of
8 United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979)
(quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 525).
9Id. at 527.
91 100 S. Ct. at 1193.
92Id.

563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977). The court stated:
[We recognize the existence of a personal privilege
which may be asserted by a legislator in a federal
criminal case to exclude from a criminal proceeding
in which he is involved any evidence of his action
performed in a strictly legislative capacity, motivations for such action, or utterances in the course of
his legislative duties. We do not find the privilege
to exist on the part of the legislature as an institution
in a similar context.
Id. at 585.
action, or utterances in the course of his legislative
duties. We do not find the privilege to exist on the part
of the legislature as an institution in a similar context.
Id. at 585.
9 563 F.2d at 583. The court noted:
Grant of the privilege is founded on unhappy experience in the past and is based on the premise
that a legislature will function better in the public
interest with the protection than without it. Though
it may hamper somewhat prosecution of the few
who are guilty of betraying the public trust, the
privilege is needed to protect the great majority of
legislators who are conscientious in the performance
of their duties.
9

the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Craig9" also
warned of the dangers of the denial of the privilege
to state legislators:
[Tihe common law history of the privilege in England and the United States teaches emphatically
that it is better to tolerate the potential abuses than
to risk the harm to our system of government that
would result from inhibiting a legislator's discharge
of the responsibility conferred upon him by the
electorate.9
Careful consideration of the risk of harm of the
denial of this privilege on the state legislative process thus reveals the need for protection of legislative independence.
The need the Framers recognized to ensure legislative independence argues persuasively for extension of the privilege to state legislators. ChiefJudge
Edwards, in his opinion in Gillock for the Sixth
Circuit,9 7 noted that the Founding Fathers were
willing to pay a price-the inability to prosecute a
few venal legislators-for an important constitutional safeguard. 98 However, the Supreme Court
dismissed Gillock's claim that the privilege was
necessary to ensure legislative independence" by
distinguishing Tenney v. Brandhove.1° ° In that case,
the Court held that state legislators who were
acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity enjoyed a common law immunity from
civil suit.' 0 ' Despite the fact that Tenney involved a
private civil action,' ° 2 and Gillock involved a federal
criminal prosecution,'03 important similarities between the cases exist, the most important of which
9'See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, rev'd per
curiam en banc, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
999 (1976). Involved in Craigwas a prosecution of a state
legislator for an alleged violation of the Hobbs Act. Id at
774. The legislator moved to suppress certain portions of
his grand jury testimony and of interviews given to postal
inspectors and an assistant United States attorney on the
ground that such testimony was privileged under the
speech or debate clause of the state constitution and at
federal common law. Id. The court of appeals held that
although the legislator enjoyed the privilege in question,
he had voluntarily waived it by testifying. Id. at 781.
9 Id. at 780.
97 United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d
at 284.
98Id. at 287.
99 100 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
'00341 U.S. 367 (1951).
101Id. at 379. In a later decision, the Court explained

that its holding in Tenney rested on its interpretation of
federal common law, not on the Speech or Debate Clause.
Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404 (1979).
0oId. at 369.
'03 100 S. Ct. at 1187.
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is the potential of disruption of the state legislative
process.
In Tenney, Justice Frankfurter identified the essence of the legislative privilege:
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy
the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duty, not for their private indulgence but for the
public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of
little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.1M
The rationale behind the speech or debate privilege is the same regardless of whether the action is
a criminal or civil one, or is brought under federal
or state law. 05 The evils to be avoided are the
deterrence of legislators from their important functions by involvement in time-consuming litigation
and the inhibition of full and free debate by fear
of litigation.' 6 The speech or debate privilege
guards against any interference with those functions. Thus, the distinction the Court drew between
'04 341 U.S. at 377.
"05 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d at 583.
The court noted:
Recognition of [the] fact [that legislators' work
could be hindered by exposing members to litigation] led the Supreme Court to grant official immunity for federal civil suits, Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951). That same concern in
common law history supports the existence of a
privilege for state legislators in federal criminal
proceedings. Principles of federal-state comity-'a
proper respect for state functions,' Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971),-reinforce this conclusion.
Id.
106United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d at 778.
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immunity from civil and criminal actions,
while
an accurate exposition of the relevant precedents,'08 misses the central theme the Court reiterated in Tenney,' ° 9 United States v. Brewster,"0 and
United States v. Johnson"' that acts done in a legislative capacity may not be scrutinized." 2 Since the
major purpose of the speech or debate privilege
was to prevent legislative intimidation," 3 the privilege should be broadly construed 4 and extended
to state legislators.

IV. CONCLUSION
Both testimonial privilege cases decided last
Term evidence the Court's attitude toward privileges which, in its opinion, needlessly hinder the
enforcement of federal criminal statutes. Trammel
and Gillock illustrate the Court's emphasis on the
governmental interest in the successful prosecution
of federal criminals. Because the justifications for
retention of the privilege were unpersuasive in
Trammel, the Court should have discarded entirely
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony,
leaving only the privilege protecting private marital communications. In Gillock, however, the Court
weighted the federal interest too heavily, thereby
endangering the independence of state legislators.
ANNE PACHCIAREK
07
1 100 S. Ct. at 1193.
08 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972). Accord,
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
'o9 341 U.S. at 377.
"o 408 U.S. at 516-17.
' 383 U.S. at 179-80.
"12 In Johnson, the Court noted
that the chief fear
prompting the legislative privilege was the instigation of
criminal charges against disfavored legislators. 383 U.S.
at 182. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
"' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 375.
"4 United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. at 180.

